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Abstract
We embed a simple incomplete-contracts model of organization design in a standard
two-country perfectly-competitive trade model to examine how the liberalization of product
and factor markets aﬀects the ownership structure of ﬁrms. In our model, managers decide
whether or not to integrate their ﬁrms, trading oﬀ the pecuniary beneﬁts of coordinating
production decisions with the private beneﬁts of operating in their preferred ways. The
price of output is a crucial determinant of this choice, since it aﬀects the size of the pecuniary
beneﬁts. Organizational choices also depend on the terms of trade in supplier markets,
which aﬀect the division of surplus between managers. We show that, even when ﬁrms do
not relocate across countries, the price changes triggered by the liberalization of product
markets can lead to changes in ownership structures within countries. The removal of
barriers to factor mobility can also induce widespread restructuring, which can lead to
increases in product prices (or declines in quality), hurting consumers worldwide.
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Recent decades have witnessed drastic reductions in barriers to commodity trade and factor
mobility around the world. Whether the result of liberalization policies — exempliﬁed by the
proliferation of regional trade agreements and by successive rounds of multilateral trade negotia-
tions — or falling transport costs, the transformation of economic life has been dramatic. There
is ample evidence that the internationalization of product and factor markets has contributed
signiﬁcantly to widespread organizational restructuring, most notably in the large — mergers
and outsourcing — but also in the small — changes in reporting structures or compensation
schemes.1 Yet the mechanisms by which changes in the global economy can eﬀect changes in
the organization of ﬁrms are not well understood. The aim of this paper is to study one such
mechanism: liberalization of product and factor markets can alter ﬁrms’ integration decisions
via the induced changes in prices.
As with other papers in the recent literature on organizations in the international economy
(e.g., McLaren, 2000; Grossman and Helpman, 2002; Antras, 2003), we depart from the tradi-
tional trade framework by opening the “black box” of the neoclassical ﬁrm. We start from a
simple model of organizational design in which, as in Hart and Holmstr¨ om (2010), a ﬁrm’s inte-
gration decision governs the trade-oﬀ between the managerial “quiet life” and the coordination
of its production activities. As shown by Legros and Newman (2009), this choice depends on two
key variables: the price at which the ﬁrm’s product is sold, and the terms of trade prevailing in
its supplier market. We embed this model of the ﬁrm in a perfectly competitive, speciﬁc-factor
model of international trade, in which trade between countries results from diﬀerences in their
factor endowments. The only signiﬁcant departure from the standard framework is that the fac-
tors of production are supplier ﬁrms that are run by managers. The model provides a tractable
analytical framework in which the eﬀects of falling trade barriers on organization can be grasped
by simple demand and supply analysis.
Intuitively, there are good reasons to believe that trade liberalization ought to have an im-
pact on the internal organization of ﬁrms. In general, organizational design mediates trade-oﬀs
between organizational goals, such as proﬁt, and private, non-contractible ones such as manage-
rial eﬀort or vision. For instance, a downstream ﬁrm may vertically integrate with its supplier
because this forces better production coordination; this reorganization is not costless, since there
may be revenue losses due to inexpert decision-making by non-specialists who take control of
1For example, the restructuring of US automakers’ relations with their suppliers in the 1980s has been at-
tributed largely to increased competition from Japanese imports and to some extent to the entry of foreign
manufacturers into US supplier markets (Dyer, 1996). Various studies have also found that the creation of re-
gional trade agreements lead to organizational restructuring activities within as well as across member countries
(e.g., Breinlich (2008) and Guadalupe and Wulf (2010) on the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement;
European Commission (1996) on the EU Single Market; Chudnovsky (2000) on the Mercosur customs union in
Latin America). Other studies have stressed the impact of trade liberalization on the reallocation of resources
across individual plants and ﬁrms (e.g., Pavcnik, 2002; Treﬂer, 2004) or in work practices (Schmitz, 2005).
1the upstream operations. Integration may be most valuable when proﬁtability is too low to
attract upstream and downstream managers away from indulging their private interests. Since
proﬁts depend on product price, changes in product markets (such as tariﬀ reductions) aﬀect
the terms of this trade-oﬀ and therefore lead to changes in the degree of integration. Similarly,
the amount of proﬁt that needs to be sacriﬁced by the ﬁrm as a whole in order to accommodate
the private beneﬁts of its stakeholders will be aﬀected by supplier ; if these change (as when
capital is allowed to cross borders), so will organizational structure.
The basic “building block” model of organizational design we use to formalize this intuition
is one in which production requires the cooperation of two types of suppliers that can either in-
tegrate or deal at arm’s length (non-integration). The production technology essentially involves
the (non-contractible) adoption of standards: output (or, in an alternate interpretation, the like-
lihood that the good produced will actually work) is highest when the two suppliers coordinate,
i.e., adopt similar decisions about their production standards. However, managers have oppos-
ing preferences – derived perhaps from the diﬀering protocols and capabilities of their respective
workforces – about the direction those decisions ought to go, and ﬁnd it costly to accommo-
date the other’s approach.2 Under non-integration, managers make their decisions separately,
and this may lead to ineﬃcient production. Integration solves this problem by delegating the
decisions rights to an additional party, called headquarters (HQ), who is motivated solely by
monetary concerns. HQ therefore maximizes the enterprise’s proﬁt by enforcing common stan-
dards between suppliers. However, HQ’s will tend to undervalue managerial private beneﬁts.
Non-integration is thus associated with high private beneﬁts and low coordination, integration
with high coordination and high private costs. Organizational design depends on how much
managers value the extra output generated by integration.3
In this setting, the price of output is a crucial determinant of ﬁrms’ organizational choices.
In particular, non-integration is chosen at “low” prices: managers do not value the increase in
output brought by integration, since they are not compensated suﬃciently for the high costs
they have to bear. Therefore, integration only occurs at higher prices.
The ownership structure of ﬁrms will also be aﬀected by the terms of trade in the supplier
markets, which determine the division of surplus between managers. The performance of non-
integration depends sensitively on how proﬁts are shared: both managers must receive substantial
shares in order to be willing to forgo the “quiet life” in favor of organizational objectives; unequal
shares result in low performance. By contrast, integration is more ﬂexible in its ability to
2As noted above, the view of the ﬁrm follows Hart and Holmstr¨ om (2010); the model is a multi-sector, multi-
country variant of the one in Legros and Newman (2009). These papers are part of a literature pioneered by
Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) that identiﬁes a ﬁrm’s boundaries with the extent of
decision rights over assets and/or operations.
3Thus our model is consistent with the classic view of integration as the result of a tradeoﬀ between spe-
cialization and coordination. But it also reﬂects the perspective expressed by Grossman and Hart (1986) that
integration does not so much remove incentive problems as replace one incentive problem with another. The
costs of integration are therefore unlikely to be ﬁxed and will depend instead on prices, the level of output, etc.
2distribute surplus between suppliers — since they do not make decisions, the proﬁt shares they
receive have no incentive eﬀects — and will therefore tend to be adopted when the supplier
market strongly favors one side or the other.
We consider the eﬀects of the successive liberalization of product and factor markets and
obtain two main results. First, even when supplier ﬁrms do not relocate across countries, freeing
trade in goods triggers price changes that can lead to signiﬁcant changes in ownership structures
within countries (waves of mergers and divestitures). Second, following the liberalization of
product markets, the removal of barriers to factor mobility can induce further organizational
changes, by aﬀecting terms of trade in supplier markets. In Home (the country will the more
productive suppliers), restructuring will entail a shift toward integration, while Foreign ﬁrms
will shift toward outsourcing.4
We also show that factor market liberalization can lead to increases in product prices (or
decreases in their quality). The intuition for this result is that, by inducing foreign exporting
ﬁrms to shift toward non-integration — the less eﬃcient ownership structure — factor mobility
can lead to a reduction in world supply.5 Reorganization has thus implications for consumer
welfare. In principle, price increases/quality losses may occur in many markets simultaneously,
oﬀsetting the normal beneﬁts of factor market liberalization, possibly hurting consumers in all
countries.
Our paper contributes to an emerging literature on general equilibrium models with endoge-
nous organizations,6 and in particular to a recent stream of this literature which has examined
ﬁrms’ organizational choices in a global economy.7 Most papers have focused on how organiza-
tional design can explain the observed patterns of intra-ﬁrm trade. Much less attention has been
devoted to how ﬁrms’ boundaries respond to falling trade costs.8 Nor to our knowledge has the
4These predictions of our model about the organizational eﬀects of trade liberalization are consistent with the
ﬁndings of recent empirical studies (Breinlich, 2008; Alfaro et al., 2010).
5This ﬁnding is in line with evidence of supply disruptions and quality losses often attributed to ﬁrms switching
from integration to non-integration. See, for example, the safety problems associated with American-designed
toys produced by Chinese contractors and sub-contractors (see “Mattel Recalls 19 Million Toys Sent From China,”
New York Times, August 15, 2007) or customers’ frustration with the outsourcing of call centers (see “Please
Stay on the Line,” Wall Street Journal, March 24, 2009).
6General equilibrium models of an industry have been used to describe how ﬁrms’ organizational choices are
aﬀected by wealth distributions and relative scarcities of supplier types (Legros and Newman, 1996, 2008) and
search costs (McLaren, 2000; Grossman and Helpman, 2002).
7Antras (2003) embeds a hold-up model of organization in a two-country international trade model with
monopolistic competition, and is mostly concerned with explaining location decisions of multinational ﬁrms and
the patterns of intra-ﬁrm trade; it does not examine organizational responses to the liberalization of product
and factor markets, which is our focus. Antras and Helpman (2004) and Grossman and Helpman (2004) study
models in which ﬁrms choose their modes of organization and the location of their subsidiaries or suppliers;
however there is no analysis of either the positive or welfare eﬀects of product and factor market integration.
Puga and Treﬂer (2010) explore the links between contractual incompleteness and product cycles, showing that
minor or incremental innovations can be important drivers of growth, particularly in emerging economies.
8An exception is Marin and Verdier (2002), which examines how trade integration aﬀects the delegation of
authority within monopolistically competitive ﬁrms in which managers cannot be given monetary incentives.
Ornelas and Turner (2008, 2010) and Antras and Staiger (2008) examine how trade liberalization may mitigate
hold-up problems by strengthening a foreign supplier’s investment incentives.
3previous literature pointed out the potential negative eﬀects that trade liberalization can have
on consumer welfare — even absent market power — through its impact on the organization of
production.
In the next section, we describe organizational choices in a closed economy. Section 3 extends
the model to two countries and examines the eﬀects of the liberalization of the markets of ﬁnal
goods on the ownership decision and on managers’ compensation schemes. Section 4 considers
the impact of the liberalization of supplier markets and its eﬀects on consumers’ welfare. Section
5 concludes with discussion some empirical and policy implications of our analysis.
2 The Model
Our model is similar to a standard speciﬁc-factor trade model between two countries, Home and
Foreign (Foreign variables are denoted with a “*”), in which trade is the result of diﬀerences
in the endowments of speciﬁc factors. As discussed in Section 2.3 below, the crucial novelty of
our model is that production inputs are assets run by managers who trade oﬀ the pecuniary
beneﬁts of coordinating their decisions with the private beneﬁts of making these decisions in
their preferred way.
In what follows, we describe the building blocks of our model in its closed-economy form.
The eﬀects of integrating goods and factor markets are studied in the following two sections.
2.1 Setup
In each economy, there are I + 1 sectors/goods, denoted by 0 and i = 1,...,I; good 0 is a
numeraire. The representative consumer’s utility (which is the same in Home and Foreign) can
be written as




where c0 represents the consumption of the numeraire good, and ci represents consumption of
the other goods. The utility functions ui(·) are twice diﬀerentiable, increasing, strictly concave,
and satisfy the Inada conditions limci→0u′
i(ci) = ∞ and limci→∞ u′
i(ci) = 0. Domestic demand
for each good i can then be expressed as a function of its own price alone, Di(pi).
Production of good i requires the cooperation of two types of input supplier, denoted A and
Bi. Bi suppliers generate no value without being matched with an A; unmatched A suppliers,
however, can engage in stand-alone production of the numeraire good 0. Many interpretations
of the A and Bi ﬁrms are possible. For example, A’s may represent light assembly plants or
basic inputs, such as energy or business services (e.g., IT, retailing, logistics) that can be used to
4produce basic consumer goods or can be combined with other inputs (Bi suppliers) to produce
more complex goods.
The goods markets operate under conditions of perfect competition: consumers and producers
take prices {pi} as given when making their choices. Prices adjust to ensure that each good
market clears. Good 0 is always traded freely across the two countries. We choose units so that
both the Home and Foreign prices of good 0 are equal to unity, and we assume that aggregate
supply of A’s in each country is large enough to sustain production of a positive amount of this
good.
The supplier markets, in which A’s and Bi’s match to form enterprises that produce the
i-goods, are also frictionless and competitive: we model equilibrium in these markets as a stable
match, a core-like concept, deﬁned below, that has become standard for modeling competition
in matching markets.9
2.2 Equilibrium in the supplier market
There is a continuum of A suppliers and Bi suppliers. Normalize the measure of A’s to unity,
and denote by ni the measure of Bi’s. The A’s are assumed to be the long side of the market:
PI
i=1 ni ≡ nB < 1. We will consider equilibria with full employment of factors, i.e., all of the
A’s and B’s in the economy will be actively engaged in producing the I + 1 goods.
All A’s are equally productive when matched with one of the Bi’s. However, A suppliers
have diﬀerent outside options, depending on their good-0 productivity: a stand-alone A-ﬁrm
can produce α units of the numeraire good, where α is distributed among the A population
according to the continuous distribution F(α).
An equilibrium in the supplier market consists of a stable match, that is a mapping from
the set of Bi’s to the set of A’s, along with a payoﬀ for each A and each Bi, satisfying three
conditions:
(1) Feasibility: the payoﬀs accruing to a matched A-Bi pair can be feasibly generated given
the price pi of the good they produce, the production technology, and the set of contracting
possibilities available to them; stand-alone Bi’s earn zero, while stand-alone A’s earn what they
can from producing the numeraire good.
(2) Stability: no (A,Bi) pair or individual A or Bi on his own could form an enterprise that
generates feasible payoﬀs for each manager that exceed their equilibrium levels.
(3) Measure consistency: the measure of matched A’s is equal to the measure of matched
Bi’s.
The derivation of the sets of feasible payoﬀs is discussed in detail in the next subsection.
Stability is a notion that applies to a market without any search frictions, since the implicit
9 See for instance, Roth and Sotomayor (1990). For an early application of a generalization of this concept
(the “f-core”) to models of ﬁrm formation, see Legros and Newman (1996).
5assumption is that at the matching stage, any unsatisﬁed A or Bi can instantaneously ﬁnd
another partner with whom to to produce. Measure consistency is a technical condition imposed
in a continuum economy to rule out one-to-one matches between sets of unequal measure.10
Once the match has occurred, each (A,Bi)-pair signs a contract, described below, and is
locked in for the duration of the production period.
The supplier market outcome will have a particularly simple characterization. Measure con-
sistency implies that some A’s must remain unmatched and produce the numeraire good, since
they are the long side of the market. Any two A’s that participate in the production of the
i-goods must get the same payoﬀ ˆ α, regardless of which industry i they are in: if not, the worse
treated A could oﬀer the better treated A’s partner slightly more surplus and still gain for herself
(she could do so because she is just as productive in making the i-good as the better-treated A),
which would violate stability.
Moreover, in equilibrium only the A’s with lower opportunity costs (those with α < ˆ α) will be
matched with Bi’s, while more productive A’s (α > ˆ α) will produce the numeraire good. If this
were not true, any unmatched A with an opportunity cost below ˆ α would oﬀer some matched
A’s partner more than she is currently receiving, again violating stability. Equilibrium surplus
of the A’s must therefore satisfy the condition11
F(ˆ α) = nB. (2)
The equilibrium A payoﬀ ˆ α acts much like a Walrasian price for A services (but note its properties
are derived from the deﬁnition of equilibrium, not assumed). As discussed in Section 2.3.3 below,
ˆ α captures the terms of trade prevailing in the supplier market, and will play a crucial role in
organizational choices.
2.3 Individual enterprises
Our basic model of the ﬁrm shares two key features with the analysis of Hart and Holmstr¨ om
(2010). First, managers in each ﬁrm enjoy monetary proﬁts as well as private non-transferable
beneﬁts associated with the operations of the ﬁrm; diﬀerent managers view these operations dif-
ferently and so their private beneﬁts come into conﬂict. For instance, a standardized production
line could be convenient for the sectorally-mobile A suppliers, but may not ﬁt the speciﬁc design
10For instance, [0,0.1] can be mapped one-to-one onto [0,1], and measure consistency rules this out; measure
consistency is trivially satisﬁed in ﬁnite matching models. Conditions guaranteeing the existence of stable matches
are fairly weak and are satisﬁed by our model; further discussion can be found in the references in footnote 9.
11This condition requires that all Bi ﬁrms obtain a positive surplus after paying ˆ α to their A suppliers.
Appendix A.1 discusses suﬃcient conditions for full employment in factor markets.
6needs of the Bi suppliers.12 Second, some ﬁrm decisions (e.g., choosing production techniques,
deciding on marketing campaigns, etc.) cannot be agreed upon contractually; only the right to
make them can be transferred through transfers of ownership.
Consider an enterprise composed of an A and a Bi. For each supplier, a non-contractible
decision is rendered indicating the way in which production is to be carried out. Denote the A
and Bi decisions respectively by a ∈ [0,1] and bi ∈ [0,1]. For eﬃcient production, it does not
matter which particular decisions are chosen, as long as there is coordination between the two
suppliers. More precisely, the enterprise will succeed with probability 1−(a−bi)2, in which case
it generates a unit of output; otherwise it fails, yielding 0. Output realizations are independent
across ﬁrms.
Overseeing each supplier ﬁrm is a risk-neutral manager, who bears a private cost of the
decision made in his unit. The A manager’s utility is yA − (1 − a)2, while the Bi manager’s
utility is yi−b2
i, where yA,yi are their respective incomes; thus the managers disagree about the
direction in which decisions should go. Since the primary function of managers is to implement
decisions and convince their units to agree, they continue to bear the cost of decisions even if
they don’t make them. We also assume limited liability: yA,yi ≥ 0.
While decisions themselves are not contractible, the right to make them can be contractually
reassigned. Revenues generated by the ﬁrm are also contractible, which allows monetary incen-
tives to be created. We assume that the managers have zero cash endowments with which to
make side payments, and so are restricted to writing contracts that share revenue contingently
on output.
Managers can remain non-integrated, in which case they retain control over their respective
decisions. Alternatively, they can integrate by contractually ceding control over a and bi to a
headquarters (HQ), via a sale of assets. HQ utility is yH: he is motivated only by monetary
considerations, incurring no direct costs or beneﬁts from the decisions a and bi.
In the supplier market that opens before production, Bi managers match with A managers, at
which time they sign contracts specifying a sharing rule and an ownership structure. The sharing
rule is characterized by s ∈ [0,1], the the share of managerial revenue accruing to manager A,
when there is success, with 1−s going to Bi. In case of failure, each receives zero. The ownership
structure is simply integration or non-integration.
For each match (A,Bi), total revenue in case of success is given by the product market price,
pi, which is taken as given by ﬁrms when they take their decisions and sign their contracts. After
contract signing, managers (or HQ) make their production decisions, output is realized, product
is sold, and revenue shares are distributed.
12Tensions about how a product should be produced could also arise because of the diﬀerent types of expertise
of the suppliers (e.g., engineering and marketing departments). Other papers (e.g., Van den Steen, 2005) have
stressed the importance for organization design of conﬂicting private beneﬁts stemming from diﬀerent corporate
cultures and/or managerial vision.
72.3.1 Integration
As with the other markets in our model, the market for HQ’s is competitive. They are elastically
supplied at (opportunity) cost h < 1
2 (the restriction ensures that integration is not too costly to
be viable). Since HQ does not care directly about a and bi, he must receive ﬁnancial compensa-
tion to cover this cost. Recall that the managers have no cash endowments, so this compensation
must take the form of a contingent share of the revenue, which we denote η: HQ receives ηpi in
case of success, and 0 in case of failure. HQ’s expected payoﬀ is therefore η(1−(a−bi)2)pi, which
he maximizes by setting a = bi. (Thus, in a competitive equilibrium, HQ’s share is η = h/pi).
Among the choices in which a = bi, the Pareto-dominant one is that in which a = bi = 1/2, and
we assume HQ implements this choice. The private cost to each supplier manager is then 1
4, and
the payoﬀs to the A and B managers are
u
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Total managerial (A + Bi) welfare under integration is
W
I




and is fully transferable via adjustments in s, because production decisions and therefore proﬁt
are unaﬀected by the managers’ shares.
2.3.2 Non-integration
Under non-integration, each manager retains control of his activity. The decisions chosen are
the (unique) Nash equilibrium of the game with payoﬀs (1 − (a − bi)2)spi − (1 − a)2 for A and
(1 − (a − bi)2)(1 − s)pi − b2















The resulting expected output is
Q
N
i (pi) = 1 −
1
(1 + pi)2, (6)
which increases with the price: as pi becomes larger, the revenue motive becomes more important
for managers and this pushes them to better coordinate. Indeed, QN
i (0) = 0, and QN
i (pi)
approaches 1 as pi becomes unbounded.























Observe that each manager’s payoﬀ is an increasing function of his share as well as of the product
price. Varying s, one obtains the Pareto frontier for non-integration. It is straightforward to
verify that this frontier is strictly concave and that the total managerial payoﬀ
W
N
i (s,pi) ≡ Q
N
i (pi)pi − (s







is maximized at s = 1/2. It is minimized at s = 0 and s = 1, where we have
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2.3.3 Choice of organizational form
To determine the choice of organization that the managers make, we must combine the integra-
tion and non-integration frontiers to derive their overall Pareto frontier.
The relative positions of the two frontiers depend on the price pi. When it is low, non-
integration dominates integration: to verify this, notice from (3)-(4) and (7)-(8) that when pi is
near zero, integration yields negative payoﬀs, while non-integration payoﬀs are bounded below
by 0. As p increases to p ≡ 1+2h
1−2h, the two frontiers coincide at the axes (i.e. where s = 0 or 1:
W N(0,p) = W I(p)), and integration dominates along the axes when p > p. On the other hand,
when s = 1/2, non-integration dominates integration at every price, i.e., W N(
1
2,pi) > W I(pi)
for all pi. Thus, the two frontiers will “overlap” on an the interval of prices (p,∞].
The signiﬁcance of this overlap, as depicted in Figure 1, which illustrates the frontiers for
a price pi > p, is that neither integration nor non-integration dominates globally. Rather, the
organization that managers choose depend on where they locate along the Pareto frontier, i.e., on
the terms of trade in the supplier market (the 45◦ line corresponds to s = 1/2). Thus ownership
structure will be the outcome of an interaction between the supplier and product markets.
Recall from Section 2.2 that, for the factor market to be in equilibrium, all A’s matched with
a Bi must receive a surplus equal to ˆ α. To facilitate the characterization of equilibrium, we make
the following restriction on the surplus of A’s when matched with a Bi:
















ˆ α0 ˆ α1
Figure 1: Frontiers
the surplus from producing good i for any price at which integration is not dominated as an
organizational choice (i.e., in Figure 1, the surplus allocation will lie above the 45◦-line whenever
pi is above some threshold that is less than p).
From (7), there is a unique value of the output share, s(ˆ α,pi) that generates a payoﬀ equal to
ˆ α for A under non-integration; it is easy to verify that s(ˆ α,pi) is increasing in ˆ α and decreasing
in pi. If the payoﬀ that remains for Bi under non-integration (W N(s(ˆ α,pi),pi)− ˆ α) exceeds the
corresponding payoﬀ under integration (W I(pi) − ˆ α), managers will choose non-integration. If
instead W N(s(ˆ α,pi),pi) < W I(pi), they will choose integration.
It can be shown that under Assumption 1 there is one price, p(ˆ α), for which the total
surpluses from integration and non-integration are equal. Integration is chosen when pi > p(ˆ α).
In Figure 1, Bi is indiﬀerent between the two ownership structures if A gets ˆ α1, but strictly
prefers integration if A gets ˆ α0. Suppose that the product price pi was equal to p(ˆ α1) and ˆ α
was equal to ˆ α1. If ˆ α fell to ˆ α0 while pi remained unchanged, then p(ˆ α0) < pi, so integration
would now be strictly preferred at pi. It follows that, for values of ˆ α that correspond to frontier
points above the 45◦-line, the set of prices at which integration is preferred increases (in the set
inclusion sense) when ˆ α falls.
The above discussion is summarized by (proof in Appendix):
Lemma 1 Under Assumption 1,
10(i) There is one solution p(ˆ α) to the equation
W
N(s(ˆ α,pi),pi) = W
I(pi);
Integration is chosen if pi > p(ˆ α) and non-integration if pi < p(ˆ α).
(ii) p(ˆ α) is increasing.
Thus, when A’s share is not too large, a fall in ˆ α becomes a force for integration.13
To sum up, managers organizational preferences depend on product prices. At low prices,
despite integration’s better output performance, revenues are still small enough that managers
are more concerned with their private beneﬁts and so remain non-integrated. At higher prices,
however, Bi managers know that revenue is large enough that under non-integration they would
be tempted to follow the A managers, who obtain little income from the ﬁrm and therefore would
choose a close to 1 (s is close to zero when the A’s share of surplus is small). Bi’s therefore
bear high private costs under non-integration, and prefer instead the relatively high revenue and
moderate cost that they incur under integration.
2.4 Industry equilibrium and the OAS curve
Equilibrium in each industry comprises a general equilibrium of the supplier and product mar-
kets. In product market i, the large number of ﬁrms implies that with probability one, the supply
is equal to the expected value of output given pi; equilibrium requires that this price adjust so
that the demand equals the supply.
To derive industry supply, suppose that a fraction θi of ﬁrms in industry i are integrated,
while the remaining 1 − θi non-integrated. Total supply at price pi is then (recall ni is the
measure of Bi suppliers)
S(pi,θi) = niθi + ni(1 − θi)Q
N
i (pi). (11)
Now θi itself is a correspondence that depends on the product price pi and the terms of trade
between suppliers ˆ α. When pi < p(ˆ α), θi = 0 and total supply is just the output when all ni ﬁrms
choose non-integration, which is increasing in pi.14 At pi = p(ˆ α), θi can vary between 0 and 1,
since managers are indiﬀerent between the two forms of organization. Finally, for all pi > p(ˆ α),
θi = 1 and output is ni. Write S(pi, ˆ α) for the supply correspondence, the Organizationally
13Relaxing Assumption 1 would not change the main results of our analysis, but would enrich the set of
comparative statics: if ˆ α were to exceed the critical threshold identiﬁed in Assumption 1, declines in ˆ α would
ﬁrst push toward non-integration (starting below the 45◦-line), then toward integration (once the 45◦-line has
been crossed).
14If pi is very low, then A’s would not be able to obtain ˆ α in partnership with a Bi; in this case, full employment
of the Bi’s could not be part of an equilibrium. The demand restrictions discussed in the Appendix rule out the
possibility that such low prices would obtain in equilibrium, so we ignore prices in this range in what follows.
11Augmented Supply (OAS) curve. The supply curve for a typical industry i is represented in









Figure 2: Organizationally Augmented Supply
Given an equilibrium return of A equal to ˆ α, an equilibrium in the product market of good
i is a price and a quantity that equate supply and demand: Di(pi) = S(pi, ˆ α). There are three
distinct types of industry equilibria, depending on where along the supply curve the equilibrium
price occurs: those in which ﬁrms integrate (I), the mixed equilibria at the price p(ˆ α) in which
there is coexistence of integrated and non-integrated ﬁrms (M), and a pure non-integration
equilibrium (N).
Finally, the economy is in equilibrium when each industry is in equilibrium relative to the
(common) A-surplus ˆ α. Our assumptions ensure that such an equilibrium always exists.
There are two comparative statics of the industry supply that are worth noting for our
analysis of trade liberalization in the next two sections. First, from Lemma 1, the “integration





expands as ˆ α falls and contracts as ˆ α rises. This implies that countries with a lower ˆ α will also
be characterized by a broader integration region. Second, an increase in ni leads the OAS curve
for good i to shift to the right. This implies that if a country has a larger measure of Bi ﬁrms,
its supply curve in that sector will be positioned to the right of the other country’s supply curve.
In the analysis presented in this section, we have focused on equilibria in product and factor
markets in a closed economy. This is equivalent to a scenario in which there are prohibitive
12barriers to trade in goods and factor mobility between Home and Foreign. In the next two
sections, we will examine the impact of the successive removal of barriers to commodity trade
and factor mobility on organizational choices. This sequencing will allow us to separate the eﬀects
of the liberalization of goods markets from those induced by factor market liberalization; it also
reﬂects the experience of many regional trade agreements, in which policies aimed at improving
factor mobility have followed the removal of tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ barriers to commodity trade.
An example is provided by the process of European integration: free trade in goods among EU
member countries was achieved in 1968, with the the creation of the EEC customs union; free
mobility of capital and labor was only introduced in 1992, with the establishment of the Single
European Market.15
We will focus on the organizational changes triggered by the full integration of product and
factor markets. Our analysis can be readily extended to the case of positive — but not prohibitive
— trade barriers, to examine the eﬀects of incomplete trade liberalization.16
3 Liberalization of Product Markets
Let us assume that Home and Foreign have identical demands and identical technologies in the
production of all goods i = 1,...,I. Trade is the result of endowment diﬀerences between the
two countries, i.e., diﬀerences in the measure of Bi suppliers. In particular, we order the goods
so that ni < n∗
i for i ∈ {1,...,m} and ni > n∗
i for i ∈ {m + 1,...,I}. Ours is thus a standard
speciﬁc-factor trade model, in which A’s are the mobile factor and Bi’s represent the speciﬁc
factors. The main diﬀerence with the traditional formulation of this model (e.g., Mussa, 1974)
is that all factors are supplier ﬁrms run by managers, who care about non-pecuniary eﬀects of
production decisions.
Under free trade, world markets for goods i ∈ {1,...,m} clear when
Mi(p
w




i , ˆ α
∗), (12)
where pw
i is the free trade equilibrium price, Mi(pw
i , ˆ α) = Di(pw
i ) − S(pw
i , ˆ α) denotes Home
imports, and X∗
i (pw
i , ˆ α∗) = S∗(pw
i , ˆ α∗) − D∗(pw
i ) denotes Foreign exports. Symmetrically, the
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i , ˆ α). (13)
15Similar patterns can be observed at the multilateral level: since the creation of the General Agreement on
Tariﬀs and Trade (GATT) in 1947, successive rounds of multilateral trade negotiation have led to the progressive
liberalization of product markets; the removal of barriers to factor mobility has only recently become part of the
agenda (e.g., the GATS and TRIMs agreements negotiated during the Uruguay Round).
16See Alfaro et al. (2010) for an analysis of the eﬀects of tariﬀ changes on ownership structures.














i ) + R0 = 0, (14)
where R0 denotes the net transfer of the numeraire good to settle the trade balance. A similar
condition must hold for the Foreign country.
To isolate the eﬀects of product market liberalization on organizational choices, we shall focus
here on trading economies with the same conditions in the supplier markets (i.e., ˆ α = ˆ α∗). The
role of factor market diﬀerences is considered in Section 4 below.
Figure 3 depicts the autarky and free trade equilibria in a product markets i ∈ {1,...,m},
in which Home imports from Foreign. Consider ﬁrst the left panel of the ﬁgure, which depicts
the Home country’s market. The intersection between the demand curve, Di = D(pi), and the
supply curve, Si = S(pi, ˆ α), determines the equilibrium autarky price, which is denoted by ˆ pi.
The graph on the right panel of Figure 3 depicts Foreign country’s market. Notice that, since
Foreign has a larger measure of Bi ﬁrms, its supply curve is positioned to the right of that of the
Home country. Given the assumption of identical demands, this implies a lower autarky price,
i.e., ˆ p∗
i < ˆ pi.
In the middle panel of Figure 3, we have drawn export supply and import demand functions
in the world market for good i. From condition (12) above, we can derive the equilibrium price
under free trade, pw
i . The move from autarky to free trade results in a price fall from ˆ pi to pw
i in
Home, and a price increase from ˆ p∗
i to pw
i in Foreign.
Through its eﬀect on product prices, the removal of trade barriers can lead to changes in
ﬁrms’ ownership structures. To see this, consider again Figure 3, which depicts the case of two
countries in which terms of trade between suppliers are the same (ˆ α = ˆ α∗), implying that the
range of prices for which managers choose integration is also the same. In this example, the
price changes triggered by trade liberalization lead ﬁrms in Foreign to vertically integrate: in
autarky, the price was too low to make integration appealing (ˆ p∗
i < p( ˆ α∗)); the price increase
triggered by trade liberalization leads managers to switch to integration (pw
i > p( ˆ α∗)). We can
thus state the following:
Proposition 1 Consider two countries with the same terms of trade in supplier markets (ˆ α =
ˆ α∗) moving from autarky to free trade. If p(ˆ α) = p( ˆ α∗) ∈ (ˆ pi, ˆ p∗
i), the price changes triggered by
trade liberalization will induce changes in ownership structures.
Proof: ˆ α = ˆ α∗ implies that in each country managers prefer integration (non-integration) if the
domestic product price is above (below) the threshold p(ˆ α) = p( ˆ α∗). Following trade liberalization,
domestic prices in each industry i will change from their autarky levels (ˆ pi, ˆ p∗
i) to a common free trade
price (pw
i ) in between them. If p(ˆ α) ∈ (ˆ pi, ˆ p∗
i), movements from autarky to free trade must cause prices









































Figure 3: Liberalization of product markets
1
5Proposition 1 states that, even if suppliers do not relocate across countries (no “oﬀshoring”),
the removal of trade barriers will lead to mergers or divestitures if autarky prices are “diﬀerent
enough”, i.e., do not lie in a region of prices for which the same organization prevails.
If autarky prices are instead very similar, then trade liberalization will not trigger changes
in ownership structures. In fact, if both autarky prices lie in the integration range (p(ˆ α),∞), so
will pw
i and thus there will be no ownership change. The same is true if autarky prices both lie
in the non-integration range (0,p(ˆ α)). Thus, the condition p(ˆ α) = p( ˆ α∗) ∈ (ˆ pi, ˆ p∗
i) is suﬃcient
and “almost necessary” for restructuring to occur.17
Notice that, even when ownership structures do not change as a result of trade liberalization,
we will expect changes in some organizational variables, such as the “power” of compensation
schemes (here represented by the size of the proﬁt shares 1−s and s), which changes continuously
with prices. Indeed, as noted in the discussion leading up to Lemma 1, A’s proﬁt share s
declines for a non-integrated ﬁrm when the industry price rises. In fact, it is easy to show that
the same comparative static results holds for integrated ﬁrms. Thus, following product market
liberalization, if the ownership structure does not change in industry i, the proﬁt shares accruing
to Bi managers should increase if i is an export industry and fall if i is an import-competing
industry. The reason is that free trade leads prices to rise in the export industries and fall in the
import industries. Of course, proﬁt shares will also change when there are changes in ownership
structure.
In light of these results, it is instructive to compare the ﬁndings in Breinlich (2008) and
Guadalupe and Wulf (2010), which study the organizational eﬀects of the Canada-U.S. Free
Trade Agreement (CUSFTA). For Canada, which as the smaller member country would be ex-
pected to have experienced the largest price changes, Breinlich documents a signiﬁcant increase
in the level of merger activity following CUSFTA; in the U.S., the corresponding eﬀects were
much smaller. Guadalupe and Wulf (2010), in their sample of U.S. ﬁrms, nevertheless ﬁnd con-
siderable evidence of reorganizations on a smaller scale, such as changes in reporting structures
and in the type of executive compensation schemes. Since the U.S. would have experienced
smaller price changes than Canada in the wake of CUSFTA, this is what our model would lead
us to expect.18
4 Factor Market Liberalization
The analysis carried out in the previous section focused on the organizational responses to price
changes triggered by the removal of barriers in product markets, in a setting in which input
17The omitted case is when p(ˆ α) happens to coincide with one of the autarky prices. In this case, ﬁrms in one
country will be in “Mix” region in autarky and only some of them will restructure after liberalization.
18For example, our model would predict smaller price changes and less dramatic restructuring in Home, if this
were endowed with a larger measure of Bi suppliers (nB > n∗
B) and a proportionally larger population.
16suppliers did not move across countries. In this section, we assume instead that product markets
are fully liberalized (so that product prices are determined by (12)-(13) above) and focus on the
organizational eﬀects of factor market liberalization. It is worth noting that “factor mobility”
here means only that the A’s and/or Bi’s are able to move across borders; Bi’s remain immobile
across sectors.
4.1 Organizational changes
Consider ﬁrst trading economies with similar factor markets. This is the scenario depicted
in Figure 3, in which the range at which integration occurs is the same in the two countries,
i.e., ˆ α = ˆ α∗. This implies that in both countries integration will be the prevailing form of
ﬁrm organization in industry i if the price exceeds p(ˆ α), while non-integration will be chosen
at lower prices. Since under free trade pi = p∗
i = pw
i , in this case, factor market integration
will have no impact on organizational choices. Therefore, once product markets are integrated,
we should expect factor market liberalization to have little eﬀect on organizational choices in
trading economies with similar factor markets (e.g., France and Germany, or the United States
and Europe).
Consider next a scenario in which Home and Foreign diﬀer in terms of their factor markets
(e.g., West and East Europe, or the United States and China). For simplicity, assume that the
total endowment of B ﬁrms is the same in the two countries (i.e., nB = n∗
B), but the Home
country’s productivity distribution of A suppliers in the numeraire sector strictly stochastically
dominates the corresponding distribution for the Foreign country, i.e., F(α) < F ∗(α), whenever
F and F ∗ are not both 0 or 1.




w) = nB + n
∗
B, (15)
where αw is the equilibrium return for all A’s matched with B’s. Hence factor liberalization
leads to the convergence in the terms of trade between suppliers across countries. In turn, this
implies that the range of prices for which integration will be chosen will also be the same for the
two countries.
Figure 4 can be used to illustrate factor market equilibria with and without factor mobility.
In the no-mobility case, A suppliers in the Home country obtain a higher surplus when matched
with B’s than do matched A’s in the Foreign country, i.e., ˆ α > ˆ α∗. Following the removal of
barriers to factor mobility, the integrated matching market will clear when condition (15) above
is satisﬁed. The equilibrium return to all matched A’s will be given by αw, with ˆ α∗ < αw < ˆ α.
Notice that convergence in factor prices can be achieved through (i) the relocation of some A
suppliers from Foreign to Home, (ii) the relocation of some B suppliers from Home to Foreign,
or a combination of both. In Figure 4, channel (i) is captured by the distribution function
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Figure 4: Pre- and post-liberalization equilibria in the factor markets
In Section 2.4, we have shown that an increase in ˆ α leads to an decrease in the range of prices
for which integration is chosen (Lemma 1). It follows that before factor market liberalization,
in every sector i, the range of prices for which integration is chosen is smaller in Home country
than in Foreign, i.e., p(ˆ α) > p(ˆ α∗).
Figure 5 shows the eﬀects of factor market integration on organizational choices in a sector
i ∈ {1,...,m} in which the Home country is an importer. Before liberalization, p(ˆ α∗) < pw
i <
p(ˆ α), so ﬁrms are non-integrated in Home and integrated in Foreign. Following the removal of
barriers to factor mobility, terms of trade in supplier markets converge to αw, implying that
the “integration range” expands in Home and is reduced in Foreign. As a result, world supply
contracts and the world price increases from pw
i to pw′
i (see Proposition 3 in the next subsection).
Notice that foreign ﬁrms switch from integration to non-integration: before liberalization, they
are integrated since pw
i > p( ˆ α∗); after liberalization, they are non-integrated since pw′
i < p(αw).
In this example, no change in ownership structures occurs in Home: since pw
i < p(ˆ α) and
pw′
i < p(αw), ﬁrms are non-integrated both before and after liberalization.
Proposition 2 Consider two countries that freely trade with each other, but have diﬀerent terms
of trade in supplier markets (ˆ α > ˆ α∗). If pw
i ∈ (p(ˆ α∗),p(ˆ α)), factor market liberalization will
induce changes in ownership structures. If the restructuring occurs at Home, it entails a move
to integration; if it occurs in Foreign, the move is to non-integration.
Proof: ˆ α > ˆ α∗ implies that p(ˆ α) > p( ˆ α∗). As a result of factor market liberalization, terms of trade


































Figure 5: Liberalization of factor markets
1
9in both countries. Since managers face the same product prices and the same terms of trade in both
countries, the same organization must prevail in both countries.
If pw
i ∈ (p(ˆ α∗),p(ˆ α)) ﬁrms are initially integrated at Home and non-integrated in Foreign. To
converge to a common organization following factor liberalization, ownership structures must thus
change in one country. If pw′
i < p(αw), non-integration prevails in both countries, implying divestitures
in Foreign. If instead pw′
i > p(αw), integration prevails, implying mergers in Home.
￿
Factor market liberalization will not trigger changes in ownership structures if the initial
world price is below p(ˆ α∗) or above p(ˆ α). Consider ﬁrst the case in which pw
i < p(ˆ α∗). Then
pw
i < p(ˆ α) as well, and ﬁrms in both countries are initially non-integrated. The only way there
could be restructuring (i.e., some movement toward integration) is if the post-liberalization price
pw′
i were to exceed p(αw) and therefore pw
i . But this cannot happen: since integration generates
more output per ﬁrm than non-integration, world supply would then be greater than it was
before liberalization, and the we would then have pw′
i < pw
i , a contradiction. The reasoning is
similar for the case in which pw
i > p(ˆ α) and ﬁrms in both countries are initially integrated. The
condition stated in Proposition 2 is thus suﬃcient and “almost necessary” for restructuring to
occur following factor market liberalization.19
It should be stressed that, in contrast to the removal of barriers to trade in goods — which
generates sector-speciﬁc eﬀects on organization by aﬀecting product prices — the removal of
barriers between factor markets aﬀects all sectors in the economy, by changing the terms of
trade in supplier markets. Before liberalization, matched A suppliers obtain a surplus p(ˆ α)
(p(ˆ α∗)) in all sectors in Home (Foreign); after liberalization, their surplus becomes p(αw) in all
sectors in both Home and Foreign.
Notice also that the organizational changes triggered by factor market liberalization are
independent of the speciﬁc patterns of factor mobility, i.e., diﬀerent factor movements have the
same impact on the terms of trade prevailing in supplier markets and on organizational choices.20
Proposition 2 suggests that countries that have already experienced organizational changes
as a result of the elimination of barriers to trade in goods (e.g., EU member countries after
the Customs Union formation in 1968) are likely to undergo further restructuring as a result of
the removal of barriers to factor mobility (e.g., increased M&A activities across EU members,
following the establishment of the Single Market, as documented by the study of the European
Commission, 1996). Such reorganizational (as distinct from relocational) activities21 will be
19As for the case of product market liberalization, we omit the boundary cases in which pw
i lies in the “Mix
region” for one of the countries (see footnote 17). Also observe that, if pw
′
i happens to coincide with the threshold
p(αw), the restructuring will only be partial but still in the direction stated in the Proposition.
20To verify this, compare the case in which only the sectorally-mobile factor of production (A suppliers) moves
across countries with the case in which only the speciﬁc factors (Bi suppliers) relocate. In the ﬁrst case, A ﬁrms
move from Foreign to Home until all matched A’s obtain the same return αw; in the second case, Bi suppliers
move from Home to Foreign, until the surplus they have to pay to A suppliers is equal to αw in both countries.
21There is nothing in the model to prevent “re-partnering” after liberalization: reorganization may involve a
20more intense between countries with large productivity diﬀerences (e.g., Germany and Romania)
rather than among those with similar productivity levels (e.g., Germany and France).
4.2 Product prices and quality
The analysis carried out above shows that factor liberalization can lead to changes in ﬁrms’
ownership structure, by aﬀecting the division of surplus between managers of diﬀerent supplier
ﬁrms. In the remaining of this section, we will examine the consequences of these changes from
the point of view of market performance.
Not only do prices aﬀect organization design, but also organizational choices aﬀect prices.
This is a simple consequence of the fact that integration generates more output than non-
integration at any price level. So a switch toward integration leads to an increase in the quantity
supplied, while the opposite is true for a switch to non-integration.
As shown in Figure 5 above, the liberalization of factor markets can trigger changes in
ownership structure which lead to a fall in world supply and to a price increase. The increase is
the result of outsourcing in the Foreign country. This will occur if pw
i is initially above p(ˆ α∗), but
below p(αw); then, following liberalization, Foreign’s integration range shrinks, its supply falls
as its ﬁrms divest; meanwhile, Home ﬁrms remain non-integrated since p(ˆ α) > p(αw). Thus in
aggregate, supply falls, so pw
i can no longer be an equilibrium price. The new price, pw′
i must be
higher than the initial pw
i . In other cases, factor liberalization will lead to an increase in world
supply and a price decrease, or leave aggregate quantities and prices unchanged.
To sum up, we can state the following:
Proposition 3 Factor market liberalization leads to a price increase (decrease) if and only if
there is a switch toward non-integration (integration) in Foreign (Home).
Proof: Factor market liberalization has the following eﬀects on product prices:
A price increase if
p(ˆ α∗) ≤ pw
i < p(αw) (corresponding to a switch to non-integration in Foreign);
A price decrease if
p(αw) < pw
i ≤ p(ˆ α) (corresponding to a switch to integration in Home);
No price change if
pw
i > p(ˆ α) (ﬁrms in both countries remain integrated);
pw
i < p(ˆ α∗) (ﬁrms in both countries remain non-integrated);
Bi supplier integrating with an A supplier, which may be diﬀerent from the one it had dealt with at arm’s length
before; or a Bj spinning oﬀ an A to enter into a non-integrated relationship with another, either at home or
abroad.
21pw
i = p(αw) (the fraction of ﬁrms that are integrated in the world is unchanged).
￿
Though systematic evidence corresponding to the eﬀects of organizational changes on product
prices does not yet appear to have been assembled, there is at least some indicative evidence of
phenomena corresponding the price increases following reorganization that we have discussed.
In particular, there are numerous accounts of falling product quality resulting (especially) from
international outsourcing (see discussion below). Our model can be easily reinterpreted to explain
such accounts. One can interpret the “quantity” produced by a ﬁrm as quality under money-back
guarantees or threat of lost repeat business: the good either delivers the consumer a positive value
with probability QN(pi) (under non-integration, else QI(pi)) or nothing. Low success probability
corresponds to low quality. Thus instead of QN(pi)ni goods delivered with probability 1, we have
ni goods of quality QN(pi).
Proposition 3 shows that, even in a setting in which ﬁrms have no market power, allowing
suppliers to relocate freely across countries can negatively aﬀect consumers by inducing ineﬃcient
organizational changes that lead to price increases (quality losses). A stronger result can also
be derived:22
Proposition 4 Factor market liberalization may reduce consumer welfare in both countries.
Proof: see Appendix.
￿
The intuition for this result is as follows. Factor liberalization leads to a more eﬃcient alloca-
tion of A suppliers across countries, resulting in a beneﬁcial increase in aggregate production of
the numeraire good: in the Home country, the payoﬀ accruing to A suppliers in the production of
i good falls from ˆ α to αw, leading some A’s to switch to the production of good 0; the opposite
happens in the Foreign country. It can easily be shown that the overall eﬀect is an increase
in world production of the numeraire good, which is beneﬁcial to consumers in both countries.
This is because more eﬃcient A’s from Home replace less eﬃcient foreign ﬁrms. However, the
increase in numeraire production may be quite small (depending on the distribution functions
F and F ∗), in which case the impact that factor liberalization has on consumer welfare depends
mainly on its eﬀects on the prices of the i goods.
4.3 An illustration: the toy industry in China
The type of ineﬃcient outsourcing described above can be illustrated by the safety problems
associated with American-designed toys assembled in China. Although some popular accounts
22See Legros and Newman (2009) for a more general welfare analysis that, which also takes account of man-
agerial costs.
22have attributed these problems to the re-location of production from the US to China, others
— and a careful look at the evidence — suggest instead that they were the result of purely
organizational changes within China: various tasks that were previously performed in factories
owned and operated by US companies (particularly Mattel) had been turned over to Chinese
contractors and sub-contractors. This calls for identifying the economic forces that led to such
apparently ineﬃcient reorganizations, something our model is suited to do.23
By the 2000s, China had become the world’s leading producer of toys. In 2007, at the time of
the product recalls, about 80 percent of the world’s toy production, and nearly 80 percent of toys
imported into the U.S. were made in China. Mattel was the world’s largest toy maker, selling
two main types of products: “core products” with highly valued brand names such as Barbie
that sell for long periods of time; and “non-core products” that sell for a relatively short term,
such as licensed characters associated with newly released movies (Lee et al., 2008). Mattel was
a pioneer in manufacturing in Asia. The ﬁrst Barbie doll, which was introduced in 1959, was
produced in Japan. In 2007, 65% of Mattel’s production was done in China. The company had
ﬁve wholly owned factories, responsible for roughly half of its toy production, a higher proportion
than that of other large toy makers such as Hasbro and RC2 (Jackson and Xiubao, 2008).
By 2007, however, Mattel was “squeezed between lower prices and higher costs” (Lee et al.,
2008). On one hand, it had to continually reduce prices in order to meet the demands of the big
retailers such as Wal-Mart and Target. On the other hand, costs were rising: in 2005, Beijing
let its currency ﬂoat, and by 2007 the yuan had appreciated by more than 9 percent against the
dollar; fuel and raw materials costs had increased; and labor costs had also been increasing by
around 10 percent a year.
In response to these pressures, Mattel partially reorganized its toy production in China.
In particular, it started to outsource more of its “non-core” products to third-party suppliers,
while continuing to manufacture in wholly-owned factories its most popular toys, such as Barbie
dolls and Hot Wheels cars. The eﬀects of this reorganization became apparent in August 2007,
when Mattel recalled 19 million Chinese-made toys from the world market because of safety fears
relating to lead paint and small magnets that could be swallowed by children.24 The substandard
toys recalled had been produced by Chinese suppliers (e.g., Lee Der Industrial Co. Ltd and Early
Light Industrial) rather than in Mattel’s wholly-owned factories (Jiangyong et al., 2009). In the
days following the recall, Mattel executives announced that they would try to “shift more of
their toy production into factories they own and operate — and away from Chinese contractors
23Other evidence is provided by Lin and Ma (2008), who ﬁnd that Korea’s experiment with service outsourcing
for the period 1985-2001 lead to a decline in productivity.
24On August 2, Mattel recalled 1.5 million Fisher-Price toys because of excessively high lead content in their
paint. Though the bulk of the aﬀected toys were recalled before they reached consumers, more than 300,000
aﬀected toys had already been sold. Within two weeks, on 14 August, Mattel announced a global recall of
another 436,000 toys due to lead paint hazards and recalled another 18.2 million toys with small magnets that
could become detached and easily swallowed by children.
23and sub-contractors”.25
The forces identiﬁed in our model can be used to interpret Mattel’s organizational choices in
China and its product recalls. Since China is the world’s leading toy exporter, the right-hand
panel of Figure 5 can represent its part of the world market for a typical subcategory of toys.26
Mattel’s experience of falling prices and increasing production costs corresponds to a drop in
pw
i and rise in ˆ α∗. In our model, both types of pressures can lead to a switch from integration
to non-integration. A fall in the price of toy manufacturers’ output, whether due to changing
consumer tastes or growing retailer market power has the same implications for organizational
choice, namely a shift toward non-integration. A rise in the opportunity cost ˆ α∗ of the Chinese toy
assemblers, whether the result of growing world factor mobility or China’s prodigious economic
growth (leading to a rightward shift in its productivity distribution F ∗(·)), has a similar impact.
Either way, the eﬀect is to raise the threshold p(ˆ α∗) above which ﬁrms prefer to integrate.
Finally, integration generates more output than non-integration, so as in Proposition 3 the
switch to non-integration leads to an increase in price or, equivalently, to a reduction in quality
(success probability), as manifested by Mattel’s product recalls.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have embedded organizational ﬁrms into a standard model of international
trade in order to examine the eﬀects of the liberalization of product and factor markets on ﬁrm
boundaries. Our “building-block” model of the ﬁrm is particularly tractable and is based on a
simple tradeoﬀ between the organizational objective (proﬁt) and managers’ private objectives
(doings things in their preferred ways).
In line with recent theoretical work in organizational economics, our paper suggests that
market conditions can signiﬁcantly aﬀect ﬁrms’ ownership structures. In particular, falling
trade barriers and increased factor mobility can aﬀect vertical integration decisions through
their impact on product prices and on the terms of trade prevailing in supplier markets. Another
implication of our analysis is that that convergence in corporate organization — the tendency
of industries to be characterized by the same ownership structure across countries — may result
not only from global cultural transmission or technological diﬀusion, but also from a standard
neoclassical market force, the law of one price.
We have studied the organizational changes of trade liberalization using a very stylized model,
in which barriers to trade are either prohibitive or non-existent. A follow-up paper by Alfaro et
al. (2010) extends the analysis by introducing import tariﬀs. The main prediction of this richer
25See the article “Mattel Recalls 19 Million Toys Sent From China,” New York Times, August 15, 2007.
26China had become an exporter of toys as a result of its (partial) liberalization to foreign investors, which
has attracted companies like Mattel and Hasbro. In our model, this could be captured by Bi suppliers moving
from Home to Foreign due to diﬀerences in production costs (ˆ α∗ < ˆ α). Since barriers to factor mobility persist,
so does a a cross-country gap in the opportunity costs of A suppliers.
24version of the model is that higher tariﬀs on ﬁnal goods, by raising product prices, should lead
protected ﬁrms to become more vertically integrated. Moreover, diﬀerences in ownership struc-
tures between countries should be smaller in sectors characterized by similar levels of protection
and between members of regional trade agreements, especially customs unions. To examine the
evidence, Alfaro et al. (2010) construct ﬁrm-level vertical integration indices for a large set of
countries. Their empirical analysis, which exploits both cross-section and time-series variation
in import tariﬀs, supports the predictions of the model.
We conclude by brieﬂy discussing some of the policy implications of our analysis. In the
standard competitive trade model, moving to full product and factor market liberalization will
maximize consumer welfare. Not so in the present model, which diﬀers from the standard one
only by the presence of managers who decide ﬁrms’ ownership structures and compensation
schemes. One implication is that optimal trade policy is likely to diﬀer from the standard one in
the presence of organizational ﬁrms. For instance, there may be a positive role for production or
export subsidies to countervail the eﬀects of ineﬃcient organizational choices. In the post-factor-
market liberalization situation depicted in Figure 5, a small subsidy may induce an exporting
ﬁrm’s managers to switch from (ineﬃcient) non-integration to (eﬃcient) integration by eﬀectively
raising the price they receive for the goods they produce.
The analysis also suggests that policies that more directly address organizational ineﬃciencies
may complement trade policy. In our model, the managers (together with HQ in the case of
integration) are full claimants of enterprise revenue, as in family ﬁrms, or other closely-held
organizations. The model could easily be adjusted to describe “managerial ﬁrms,” in which the
primary decision makers have low ﬁnancial stakes. Suppose the managers receive only a small
fraction λ < 1 of the revenues, with the remainder accruing to dispersed shareholders who have
little control over major organizational decisions. It is straightforward to show that managers
will decide to integrate only when product price exceeds p(ˆ α)/λ, a smaller range of prices than
in the case considered so far (for which λ was equal to 1).
The smaller is λ, the more shareholders’ interests diverge from those of management, because
they value revenue but not managerial private costs (and since they take prices as given, they
have no interest in restricting their ﬁrm’s output). Consumers also beneﬁt from larger values of
λ, which imply that high-output integration is chosen more often. Corporate governance policy
that oﬀers strong shareholder protection or gives them greater monitoring and/or control over
management eﬀectively increases λ, and therefore beneﬁts consumers.
In particular, good corporate governance reduces the likelihood that factor liberalization
leads to a price increase and thus to a loss in consumer surplus. Moreover, product market
liberalization becomes more eﬀective: the gains from liberalization are larger if organization is
chosen to maximize output rather than managerial welfare. It is in this sense that we view
governance and trade policies as complementary, and it is not surprising that the European
Commission has proposed an Action Plan on corporate governance to “strengthen shareholders’
25rights” and to “foster the eﬃciency and competitiveness of business, with special attention to
some speciﬁc cross-border issues” (see Commission press release, May 21 2003).
Appendix
A.1 Full Employment Equilibrium
Deﬁne p0(α) to be the lowest price at which an A who accrues all the surplus (s = 1) under
non-integration can obtain α : W N(1,p0(α)) =
p0(α)2
1+p0(α) = α. Note this equation has a unique
solution, increasing in α, and independent of the sector. Consider a generic equilibrium in which
matched A suppliers obtain surplus ˆ αG. It follows from Assumption 1 that p0(αG) < p(αG),
implying that non-integration prevails at p0(αG).
To guarantee that all Bi’s are employed, we require that there is excess demand for good i
at p0(αG), implying that the equilibrium price must exceed p0(αG). Let nG
i be the endowment
of Bi’s. Then for full employment it is enough that








Since ui(·) is concave and p0(·) increasing, this condition is more stringent the larger is αG and
the larger is nG
i . In the text we make assumptions on the model’s fundamentals that guarantee
that the Home autarky value ˆ α is an upper bound for all equilibrium values of matched-A payoﬀs.
The largest endowment to consider is the larger of the Home and Foreign endowments ni and
n∗
i. We can therefore ensure that there is full employment in all scenarios we discuss with




Proof of Lemma 1









Note that g(pi) is continuous (in fact, diﬀerentiable); it is straightforward to verify that it is
strictly increasing for 0 ≤ h < 1
2, and vanishes at pi = p ≡ 1+2h
1−2h.















((2 + pi)s −s2) = α, is the
proﬁt share that guarantees A a payoﬀ of α under non-integration: integration is chosen only if
pi ∈ PI (ˆ α). Equivalently, we need
2s(α,pi)(1 − s(α,pi)) ≤ g(pi). (17)
Now, Assumption 1 ensures that s ∈ [0,1/2] for any equilibrium ˆ α, and 2s(1 − s) is increasing
on [0,1/2]. From (7), s(α,pi) is increasing in α and decreasing in pi.Thus (17) is satisﬁed if and
only if
s(ˆ α,pi) ≤ h(pi),
where h(·) is a continuous, increasing transformation of g(·). Since g is increasing, so is h. Thus
if p′
i > pi, and integration is chosen at pi, we have
s(ˆ α,p
′
i) < s(ˆ α,pi) ≤ h(pi) < h(p
′
i),
and integration is also chosen at p′
i. Thus, PI (ˆ α) can be written as an interval [p(ˆ α),∞). Note
that p(0) = p.
(ii) Since s increases with ˆ α, and W N(s,pi) increases in s on [0,1/2], W N(s,pi) increases in
ˆ α. It follows that PI (ˆ α) is decreasing (in the sense of set inclusion), i.e., that p(ˆ α) is increasing.
Proof of Proposition 4
Proposition 3 shows that, even in a setting in which ﬁrms have no market power, allowing
suppliers to relocate freely across countries can negatively aﬀect consumers by inducing ineﬃcient
organizational changes. However, factor liberalization also leads to a more eﬃcient allocation
of A suppliers across countries, resulting in a beneﬁcial increase in aggregate production of the
numeraire good 0. In what follows, we derive a suﬃcient condition for factor market liberalization
to hurt consumers in both countries.
Recall that ni (n∗
i) denotes the measure of Bi ﬁrms in Home (Foreign) and that
PI





B. Let us assume that nB = n∗
B = n and that ni + n∗
i = 2n/I, ∀i. This
guarantees that the world supply is the same across sectors. We also assume that all sectors
have the same aggregate demand. Together, these assumptions imply that the price changes and
the welfare eﬀects of factor liberalization will be the same in all sectors of the economy. Using
the proof of Proposition 3, we can then identify conditions such that the equilibrium world price
will strictly increases after factor market integration. Let L > 0 be the resulting loss in welfare.
Let αw =
1
2(ˆ α + ˆ α∗), where F(ˆ α) = F ∗(ˆ α∗) = n and F(αw) + F ∗(αw) = 2n. That is, before
factor market liberalization A suppliers have outside options ˆ α and ˆ α∗ in Home and Foreign,
27respectively, while they have outside option αw after the liberalization.
Now, since ˆ α > αw > ˆ α∗, some Home A suppliers that before liberalization were employed
in the production of I goods will start producing the numeraire good; at the same time, some
Foreign A suppliers that were originally producing the numeraire good will start producing the
other goods.









integrating by parts and using the equilibrium conditions F(ˆ α) = n, F ∗(ˆ α∗) = n and F(αw) +






















w − ˆ α
∗) + (n − F(α
w))(ˆ α − α
w) (18)
and since αw = 1







w))(ˆ α − ˆ α
∗). (19)
Consider two distribution functions F ∗(x;ǫ),F(x;ǫ) that are linear on the interval [ˆ α∗, ˆ α] and
that satisfy F ∗(ˆ α;ǫ) = n + ǫ and F(ˆ α∗;ǫ) = n − ǫ. Since there is no restriction on F(x;ǫ) and
on F ∗(x;ǫ) outside the interval [ˆ α∗, ˆ α], as ǫ varies it is possible to ﬁnd ‘completions’ of these
functions such that the overall distributions are indeed distribution functions.
By construction, F ∗(αw;ǫ) − F(αw;ǫ) = ǫ. Therefore, by (18), for all ǫ < 2L/(ˆ α − ˆ α∗), the
welfare loss resulting from the increase in the price of all i-goods more than oﬀsets the welfare
gain associated with increased consumption of the numeraire good.
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